COURT OF APPEALS				
STATE OF NEW YORK				
MICHAEL SOMEREVE, ET AL.,				
Respondents,				
-against-				
PLAZA CONSTRUCTION CORP.,	NO	. 33		
Appellant.				
		20 Eag Albany, February	New	York
Before:		1	ŕ	
CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIF		77		
ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY 1 ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E				
ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J				
ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL FI				
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Appearances:				
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1	CHIEF JUDGE DIFTORE: The next appeal on the
2	calendar is number 33, Somereve v. Plaza Construction.
3	Good afternoon, Counsel.
4	MR. FISHMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honors. My
5	name is Howard Fishman. I'm with Rafter & Associates, on
6	behalf of the Appellant Plaza Construction Corporation.
7	I'd like to reserve two minutes for rebuttal, if I may?
8	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Of course.
9	MR. FISHMAN: Thank you.
10	Plaza submits that the placement
11	plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was premature
12	because Plaza demonstrated that further discovery regarding
13	the accident could establish that the plaintiff's negligent
14	operation of the prime mover was the sole proximate cause
15	of his injuries.
16	JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel Counsel, in your
17	papers, did you argue that this wasn't a 240 case, you
18	know, opposing summary judgment? That this case didn't
19	fall within that Labor Law provision?
20	MR. FISHMAN: The initial papers before the
21	Supreme Court?
22	JUDGE GARCIA: Yeah.
23	MR. FISHMAN: I believe it was argued that the
24	accident could have occurred due of to his own
25	negligence, not necessarily sole proximate cause. So if it

1	wasn't a 240 case, then, you know, it's it was just a
2	standard negligence case, and yes, I believe we did argue
3	that.
4	JUDGE GARCIA: You did?
5	MR. FISHMAN: Yes.
6	JUDGE RIVERA: But you didn't argue that it's not
7	an elevated risk?
8	MR. FISHMAN: I mean excuse me?
9	JUDGE RIVERA: You didn't argue that it's not an
10	elevated risk. Your your position, I thought
11	MR. FISHMAN: No, it's not.
12	JUDGE RIVERA: was he's the sole proximate
13	cause.
14	MR. FISHMAN: Right, it's the argument is
15	that it's not an elevated risk, because he didn't fall from
16	an elevated height. He fell possibly from an eight-inch
17	platform and basically fell off the prime mover. That's
18	what his testimony was to Mr. Krammer.
19	JUDGE RIVERA: But is that the argument that you
20	made? I thought your argument was limited to the sole
21	proximate cause.
22	MR. FISHMAN: No, the argument was
23	JUDGE FAHEY: Which of course, is a a Labor
24	Law defense. That's why I I'm sorry; I thought that
25	in response to Judge Garcia's question, I I thought

this was - - - this was a Labor Law action and I - - -1 2 MR. FISHMAN: It is a Labor Law action. 3 JUDGE FAHEY: I - - - I didn't think that you 4 were arguing that it wasn't a Labor Law case. I just 5 thought you were arguing that - - -6 MR. FISHMAN: Well - - -7 JUDGE FAHEY: - - - he had certain defenses to 8 it. 9 MR. FISHMAN: Yes, but we're arguing that the 10 motion was premature in that there was additional discovery 11 that was necessary - - -12 JUDGE FAHEY: Well, I understand that. 13 want to be clear about what - - - you weren't arguing that 14 this is a comparative negligence case. 15 MR. FISHMAN: No, we're not arguing it's 16 comparative negligence. We're arguing that there was a 17 possibility that the plaintiff's admitted negligent 18 operation of the prime mover was the sole proximate cause 19 of his injuries and that we needed discovery to explore 20 that. 21 JUDGE FAHEY: Right. 22 MR. FISHMAN: That discovery may also reveal that 23 this is not even a Labor Law case, but we're not there yet, 24 because we didn't get that discovery. For example, there 25 could be other reasons for the accident to have occurred

1 other than the implication of Section 240. 2 JUDGE FEINMAN: So - - - so on that, let's get a 3 couple of facts clear. Had you actually served subpoenas 4 on any of these other eyewitnesses? 5 MR. FISHMAN: Yes, two - - - well, two subpoenas 6 were served - - -7 JUDGE FEINMAN: It's a yes or a no. 8 MR. FISHMAN: Yes. 9 JUDGE FEINMAN: Either you served them or you 10 didn't. 11 MR. FISHMAN: Two subpoenas were served on Mr. 12 Catalano and Mr. Caratini. There are additional 13 eyewitnesses which we had yet to identify by full name. 14 There was, at least, two individuals known as Mike. One 15 was Mr. Caratini's partner. There was an individual in the 16 scaffold known as Mike. I don't know if they're talking 17 about the same person or somebody else. There's also, 18 plaintiff had testified, that there was an individual who 19 gave him hand motions, who was also in the scaffold. 20 don't know who that person is yet either. 2.1 We had approximately three weeks from the time 2.2 that we conducted our deposition - - - the claimant's 23 deposition - - -24 JUDGE FEINMAN: All right. And so they make

their motion. That results in an automatic stay of

discovery.

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2.2

MR. FISHMAN: Correct.

JUDGE FEINMAN: Did anybody go to the trial judge and say, can you lift the stay?

MR. FISHMAN: Yes, because we had already served the subpoenas and also had already noticed the depositions of Mr. Catalano and Mr. Caratini. The plaintiff then rejected to taking those depositions. We had a conference before Justice Singh's law secretary. And it was - - - came back that those depositions or any discovery couldn't proceed because of the stay of discovery, pending the motion for summary judgment.

So we were precluded from taking those depositions, which were noticed, I believe, for some time in July or August, based upon the filing of the motion for summary judgment in June of 2013, just six or eight weeks after our depositions in May of - - - May of 2013.

JUDGE STEIN: What is your - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: So in your opposition to summary judgment, did you argue that - - - that he had been provided with a safety device or some kind of safety instructions?

MR. FISHMAN: Well, we argued that the whole - - the prime mover itself is a safety device; in that, it's
a machine that's used to hoist the materials and it was



1	regularly used at the site to hoist pallets of bricks from
2	the ground and place it on the scaffold.
3	JUDGE FAHEY: Well, let's stay with that. Let's
4	let's say that you're correct, logically. Aren't you
5	required to provide a safety device that operates so as to
6	protect the worker, right?
7	MR. FISHMAN: Yeah, when we
8	JUDGE FAHEY: You would agree with that
9	proposition?
10	MR. FISHMAN: And and
11	JUDGE FAHEY: So let me finish.
12	MR. FISHMAN: Yes.
13	JUDGE FAHEY: You agree with that, though, right?
14	MR. FISHMAN: Yes.
15	JUDGE FAHEY: All right. That's your obligation
16	So if that's the case, can you say that this safety device,
17	this prime mover, operated so as to protect the worker?
18	MR. FISHMAN: Well, the the safety device
19	that's provided for something that hoists is to protect the
20	worker from being struck by the item that's being hoisted.
21	When you when you're standing on a platform that's
22	eight inches off the ground, there's not a reasonable
23	explanation
24	JUDGE FAHEY: You know, the funny thing is, is
25	these cases there's a lot of these cases of of

forklifts - - - people being thrown up in the air in the forklifts. That's why they were redesigned and changed - - - the design was changed on them. Also, bobcats tipping over, and these aren't really - - - particularly unusual cases. These accidents do happen. In other words, that they're misoperated, and - - - and somebody gets hurt as a result of the misoperation.

MR. FISHMAN: Right.

JUDGE FAHEY: So I think in a case like this, we would assume that the plaintiff might not have operated correctly, probably hit the fork somewhere on the scaffold, and then caused the thing to tilt. So it didn't protect him then when it threw him up in the air, right?

MR. FISHMAN: Well, that's the question. Did it throw him up and off the air or not? I mean, it's a question of fact whether he was thrown off in the air, because he taped - - - told Mr. Krammer, "I fell off the machine; I simply fell off the machine." That's what Mr. Krammer - - -

JUDGE FAHEY: Right.

MR. FISHMAN: -- rel -- relates in his onset report, that he fell off.

JUDGE RIVERA: But even if he fell off the machine, didn't you have to provide him with a safety device so he wouldn't fall off the machine? I mean, if

1	you're up in the air
2	MR. FISHMAN: That's
3	JUDGE RIVERA: the potential to fall is
4	always there.
5	MR. FISHMAN: Well, that's
6	JUDGE RIVERA: Isn't that the point of the
7	statute?
8	MR. FISHMAN: That's what we have to
9	JUDGE FAHEY: I thought to Krammer's EBT seemed
LO	to be pretty consistent in his description of the accident
11	with the plaintiff description of it.
L2	MR. FISHMAN: I don't believe so
L3	JUDGE FAHEY: Oh.
L4	MR. FISHMAN: because Mr. Krammer gave a
L5	number of explanations as to what plaintiff told him had
L 6	occurred.
L7	JUDGE FEINMAN: But the reality is Krammer isn't
L8	there. He doesn't see the accident, and everything he has
L 9	to say is really speculation
20	MR. FISHMAN: Well
21	JUDGE FEINMAN: other than the fact
22	the only thing he knows is that, when he comes to the
23	scene, the the machine is upright.
24	MR. FISHMAN: Well, he knows the machine is
25	upright. He knows that the machine did not tilt, because

if it tilted, it would have needed some other equipment to re-right it. So we know that the machine did not tilt over; it didn't slam into the ground. So that's - - - we know that.

JUDGE FEINMAN: Right.

2.2

MR. FISHMAN: We know - - -

JUDGE STEIN: What is your theory about how you think the plaintiff could have been the  $-\ -\ -$  the sole proximate cause of this  $-\ -\ -$ 

MR. FISHMAN: We think the plaintiff - - - well, the plaintiff could have been the sole proximate cause because he - - - you know, assuming that he did fall from the machine in the manner he suggests, he could have slammed on the brakes of the machine when he came in contact with the scaffold. The machine may have just tilted slightly when it came in contact with the scaffold, if he slammed on the brakes. He may not have - - he may have had the pallet blocking his vision and didn't observe the - - you know, the scaffold itself. He didn't follow the directions of the person on the scaffold that was giving him the hand signals. I mean, there's a var - - variety of reasons of how the accident could have occurred.

JUDGE FAHEY: But aren't those all comparative negligence questions, not sole proximate cause questions?

MR. FISHMAN: No, because when you have a



situation where the lift itself is not defective, the lift 1 2 operates properly, the lift - - -3 JUDGE FAHEY: Well, sole proximate cause usually 4 involves either the refusal to use a safety device or a 5 disregarding a supervisor's instructions on a safety 6 device. Is it - - -7 MR. FISHMAN: Just that - - -8 JUDGE FAHEY: Let me finish. It falls within one 9 of those two categories. Everything you've described means 10 that he didn't operate the machine correctly. He made a mistake. 11 12 MR. FISHMAN: Well, those are the more recent 13 cases dealing with sole proximate cause. But going back to 14 the more historic cases, like - - - such as Blake, when 15 this court determined that it was a question for the jury 16 to decide - - - rightfully to decide - - -17 JUDGE FAHEY: It's a funny thing about Blake; 18 both parties quote it - - -19 MR. FISHMAN: Well - - -20 JUDGE FAHEY: - - - in this case. 21 MR. FISHMAN: You see, but in Blake, there - - -22 there's no definitive proof that the plaintiff failed to 23 lock the - - - the locking mechanism on the ladder. 24 - we get to it in sort of reverse fashion. You can get to 25 it by finding that the ladder is properly placed.

admitted it was properly placed. He admitted that the 1 2 ladder was not defective. He just couldn't recall whether 3 or not he had locked the ladder or not. And yet - - -4 JUDGE RIVERA: But - - - but here - - - that - -5 - that's my point. Here, what - - - what's the safety 6 device - - -7 MR. FISHMAN: Well - - -8 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - for him not to fall off? 9 How - - -- how have you provided something to minimize that 10 risk or avoid the risk completely? 11 MR. FISHMAN: Well, we submit that there is no 12 safety device required to protect him from - - - from an 13 eight-inch elevation by standing on a platform - - -14 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay, did - - - did you - - -15 JUDGE FAHEY: But then we're back to - - -16 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - submit anything in 17 opposition to the motion to summary judgment related to 18 that response? 19 MR. FISHMAN: Well, that issue wasn't argued 20 below, because the issue that the plaintiff had argued 2.1 before both the trial court and the First Department was 2.2 that the lift itself tipped over because it was inadequate 23 to handle the load. The - - - the argument that he should 24 have been provided with some sort of seat belt or whatever,



some unidentified safety device, was first raised in the

plaintiff's brief in this court. 1 2 So - - -3 JUDGE FEINMAN: But - - - but you didn't say in 4 opposition to the motion, wait a minute, Judge, this is not 5 a 240 case to begin with. 6 MR. FISHMAN: Well, we argued that there was 7 discovery that was necessary. And so because - - -8 JUDGE FEINMAN: No, no - -9 MR. FISHMAN: - - - once this case is premature, 10 then a lot of things can happen once the discovery comes 11 I don't know what the discovery is going to relay. 12 just know that the depo - - - the depositions, the 13 eyewitnesses who are on the - - - on the scaffold itself, 14 could relate as to exactly what happened. We don't know 15 what happened. All I know is we have questions of fact all 16 over the place as to what might have happened. Because he 17 testifies that he only lifts the scaffold five feet - - -18 only - - - only lifts the pallet five feet. The scaffold's 19 six feet tall and yet - - -20 JUDGE FEINMAN: All right, so - - - so - - - but 21 the - - - the - - -2.2 MR. FISHMAN: - - - the pallet ends up on - - -23 JUDGE FEINMAN: I - - - I just want to be clear 24 about who has control over these various eyewitnesses. 25 Whose employees are they?



1 MR. FISHMAN: Town Masonry; they're third 2 parties. They're nonparties. 3 JUDGE FEINMAN: Okay. 4 MR. FISHMAN: Nonparties. 5 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel. 6 MR. FISHMAN: Thank you. 7 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel? 8 MR. ISAAC: Good afternoon, Your Honors. 9 Isaac, I represent the plaintiff-respondent. Before I get 10 into my argument, I just wanted to correct a couple of factual statements, and I have record references for you. 11 12 Judge Fahey, you had asked a question about what 13 Krammer said. Krammer said exactly what the plaintiff 14 said, 345, line 15: "I went over to look at the handlebars 15 and piece of machinery to see how he" - - - referring to the plaintiff - - - "said. He said he flew over the 16 17 handlebars, and I'm like either - - - that it's like 18 falling off a motorcycle. You slam on the brakes and fly 19 off. He said he hit the ribs" - - - it should be his ribs, 20 but the ribs - - - "on the handlebar." 21 JUDGE STEIN: That doesn't sound to me like the 22 same as being thrown up in the air, hitting the ceiling, 23 and coming back down. That sounds like a completely

MR. ISAAC: Well, when you fly over the handle -

different explanation.

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1	
2	JUDGE STEIN: Well, you fly over
3	MR. ISAAC: and the handle where it is,
4	that's what that's what he said, so I
5	JUDGE STEIN: And you hit your ribs, that doesn'
6	indicate to me
7	MR. ISAAC: He hit his
8	JUDGE STEIN: that you're being thrown in
9	the air.
LO	MR. ISAAC: hit his hit his ribs on
1	on on the way up. That's that's
L2	that's what he meant.
L3	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Very basically, what's the
4	statutory violation here?
L5	MR. ISAAC: The statutory violation is that the
16	prime mover did not function as intended by catapulting
L7	plaintiff. As Judge Fahey said, there are about seven
L8	cases dealing with catapults, and the catapults are not
L9	just
20	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: So what is it about the
21	prime mover that was defective or inadequate?
22	MR. ISAAC: Well, here's the thing. My adversar
23	keeps referring to that, but when you look at the statute,
24	the statute itself refers not just to defects, but to op -



- - to de - - - to improper use, operation, or control.

And if you read my brief, I believe the Third Department - - sorry - - - has the Morin line of cases which say that,
when you're dealing with improper operation, improper use,
showing a physical defect is irrelevant. That's - - these are the ladder cases.

2.1

Every Appellate Division, every intermediate

Appellate Division, has held that you do not have to prove defectiveness when the ladder is insecured, even in situations where the plaintiff set up the ladder by himself

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: So what should be done in - with respect to a prime mover being used at a job site?

MR. ISAAC: The prime mover should be used in a way that doesn't cause somebody on the back to be catapulted. Now, I agree that there are two - - - two potential problems. The plaintiff's testimony is, I was moving it; I was four to six feet away; I went down and I flew up. Defendant's position is, I believe, as Judge Tom said in the last part of his decision, was that the plaintiff was actually either loading it and loaded it too hard, or actually stuck it. The fact is, since Rocovich, since Haimes, since Zimmer, since Bland, comparative negligence is not a defense to a 240(1) claim.

Now the problem is - - -

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Fair.



1 MR. ISAAC: - - - that it is very, very, very 2 difficult to distinguish between comparative negligence and 3 sole proximate cause. 4 JUDGE RIVERA: So on the - - - on the summary 5 judgment, what - - - what was your argument about the 6 safety device? Are you - - - are you also in agreement 7 that the safety device is the actual machinery? 8 MR. ISAAC: No, my - - - my - - - our argument 9 below was that there was no safety device to prevent the 10 plaintiff from being catapulted off. Zero. 11 JUDGE FEINMAN: So what should have been there? 12 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: A cage? 13 JUDGE FEINMAN: A belt? A - - -14 MR. ISAAC: You could have had - - - you could 15 have had - - - well, the reason they didn't have it is 16 obviously because nobody thought that this would happen, 17 and that's - - - if you look at all the cases, Potter, 18 Bilderback, Penaranda, they're all the same. Nobody ever 19 expects it to happen. But you could - - - you could 20 prevent this accident easily. Just have a harness on it. 2.1 Just nobody ever thinks it's going to happen. 2.2 The fact of the matter is, though - - -23 JUDGE RIVERA: So what was your burden of proof 24 on that summary judgment related to this question about the 25 safety device?

2	function properly. And let me go to the O'Brien case
3	JUDGE RIVERA: The device here being the machine
4	that he's riding?
5	MR. ISAAC: Yes, the machine as it was being
6	operated did not function as intended. And let me go to
7	the O'Brien case. And Judge Fahey, you brought up a
8	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: And "as intended" is to
9	have the operator remain on the little platform, no matter
10	what happens.
11	MR. ISAAC: You bet. No one who's on a on
12	a Hi-Lo, on a prime mover, on a bobcat, they're not
13	supposed to fly off. No one can say that that's a a
14	permitted use of that
15	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: So this machine has that
16	platform that also kicks up, right, and you can walk behin
17	it like a lawnmower, almost
18	MR. ISAAC: Yes, what you do is
19	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: right?
20	MR. ISAAC: you fix the platform
21	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Right.
22	MR. ISAAC: and then you use it like a
23	lawnmower; that's correct.
24	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: What happens if he's
25	walking behind it and he smashes his head for some reason?

MR. ISAAC: To show that the device did not

Same deal?

MR. ISAAC: Well, not the same deal, because you have a different fact. Now you might not have an elevation-related risk. But here there are multiple elevation-related risks caused by the fact that not only are you on an - - an object that's capable of catapulting you, but you're clearly, under Runner, have an elevation-related risk, because you are actually lifting a 1,500-pound load into an area that is actually fraught with danger. And I wanted to - - -

JUDGE STEIN: But I think the question is, what if he was walking behind the prime mover, lifting this load, and the same thing happened, only instead he fell forward and hit his head on - - - on the back of the prime mover?

MR. ISAAC: Well, I think you'd have a different situation, based on your decision in Rocovich. Rocovich basically says that not every elevation-related risk that you have falls within the Labor Law.

JUDGE STEIN: Well, so - - - but here, that's the point is that we - - - there are apparently some witnesses who actually saw what happened, and - - - and what we really have only is the testimony at this point of what the plaintiff now says happened and what the supervisor says he said happened. So don't we need to hear from these other

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witnesses to determine whether, in fact, this is a 240
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        case, an elevation-related case, to see how - - - what - -
 3
        - what actually happened? Because to me, if he's standing
 4
        on the back, and he went - - - and he was propelled forward
 5
        and hit his ribs on - - - on the handlebars or whatever
 6
        they are, that's a - - - that's a completely different
7
        issue, so - - -
 8
                  MR. ISAAC: Yeah, but that - - -
 9
                  JUDGE STEIN: - - - why don't we need - - - why
10
        is - - - why don't we need this discovery before we can
11
        say, as a matter law, what caused this accident?
12
                  MR. ISAAC: I can give you one factual reason and
13
        one legal reason. Let me give you the factual reason.
14
        It's as simple as - - - as the day. If you look at page
15
        441 to 443 of the record. That's Mr. Catalano. That's the
16
        - - - that's - - - that's the witness that they subpoenaed.
17
        They have his affidavit. So the - - - to say that you need
18
        discovery when you have the affidavit of a witness who's
19
        there, it really doesn't make any sense.
20
                  The legal argument is then - - -
21
                  JUDGE STEIN: Well, sure it does, because that's
22
        --- he's --- he's not been subject to ---
23
                  MR. ISAAC: They prepared his affidavit.
24
                  JUDGE STEIN: I understand - - -
25
                  MR. ISAAC: So - - - and - - - and I - - -
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JUDGE STEIN: I understand, but he's one of 1 2 several witnesses. 3 MR. ISAAC: Well, but the fact of the matter is 4 that, just because there's outstanding discovery, doesn't 5 mean that I have to wait on my summary judgment motion, and 6 as we - - -7 JUDGE WILSON: Is there nothing - - -8 MR. ISAAC: -- as we --9 JUDGE WILSON: Is there nothing the other 10 witnesses could say that would change the result? That is 11 12 MR. ISAAC: I don't - - - I don't think so, 13 because - - -14 JUDGE WILSON: So if they said we saw him trying 15 to pop a wheelie? 16 MR. ISAAC: Well, here - - - there's no - - -17 JUDGE WILSON: I know there's no evidence of 18 that, but that's because there's no evidence. 19 MR. ISAAC: Right, there's no - - - there's no 20 evidence. You have to have - - - you have to show under 21 the cases in your decision - - - your cases are Chemical 22 Bank v. PIC Line, and Auerbach v. Bennett - - - not just 23 that you have the right to conduct discovery or even that 24 discovery is outstanding, but that you made some effort and

that you know what these witnesses are going to show.

1	JUDGE FEINMAN: Well, you know, when they hear
2	what the plaintiff has to say and who might be there,
3	within three weeks they're serving subpoenas, but you've
4	already beat them and gotten the partial summary judgment
5	stay
6	MR. ISAAC: The action this
7	JUDGE FEINMAN: excuse me, the automatic
8	stay.
9	MR. ISAAC: Your Honor, that that's
10	certainly true, except this action's been going on for
11	three years. It's not like we didn't make it's not
12	like it's not like they didn't have the opportunity
13	to do this right away.
14	JUDGE FEINMAN: So why is this not controlled by
15	Groves v. Lands End?
16	MR. ISAAC: Because in this case, in Groves v.
17	Lands End, the First Department and this court said that
18	there were different versions of the accident. There are
19	no different versions of the accident here. There are
20	none. If you look at
21	JUDGE RIVERA: Did
22	JUDGE FEINMAN: We don't know if there we
23	don't know if there are other
24	JUDGE RIVERA: did they argue that
25	that he wasn't on top? I understand they're arguing we

don't know what happened, but did they argue that he was 1 2 3 MR. ISAAC: I didn't - - -4 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - actually using it - - -5 MR. ISAAC: No - - -6 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - and on the platform? 7 MR. ISAAC: - - - there - - - there is no 8 testimony whatsoever. There's not a medical record. There 9 isn't a contrary statement. There isn't a hearsay 10 statement that contradicts what the plaintiff said. Nothing. Zero. That's what he was supposed to be doing. 11 In fact, Judge Stein and Judge Rivera, apropos to what you 12 13 just asked, and Judge Feinman as well, let me read to you 14 what Mr. Catalano said. This is the supervisor. The one 15 who says that - - - the one whose affidavit they have. 16 I'm reading it, pa - - - paragraph 8, 442: "The 17 pallet bricks weighed approximately 1,500 pounds, which was 18 within the capacity of the prime mover. Indeed, we had 19 moved and lifted similarly weighted pallets of bricks with 20 the same prime mover for several weeks prior to August 5, 21 2011, without any problems being noted or communicated. 22 There was no indication that the prime mover malfunctioned 23 or that it had been overloaded at the time of the 24 accident." This was a permitted use. This is what they

25

did.

JUDGE RIVERA: Does he say I saw him standing on the machine and using it?

MR. ISAAC: Well, I - - - he did - - - he clearly wasn't a witness, but he came there afterward. The part I read before is - - - came afterward. So it wasn't like he wasn't injured. And - - - and I just wanted to say one thing. If you take a look at your cases, I think this breaks down very, very simply, and I'm not going to go over my time, because I don't.

There's a difference between comparative negligence and misuse, okay. And I actually figured it out, believe it or not, at 7:42 this morning when I was walking by the Albany Port and trying to figure out the cases you were going to ask me. Here's the difference. If I'm driving a vehicle, and I make a turn to come to Eagle Street and I hit a pedestrian, that's comparative negligence, because I'm doing something that I should be doing with my car, but I'm doing it badly.

If I miss the Eagle Street turn and I decide that I'm not going to go around, but I'm going to back up and back up into that spot, that's a misuse. If you take a look at every one of your decisions, I checked every one, from Haimes, to Felker, to Gordon, to Batista, which is mine, Weininger, Blake, it breaks down perfectly.

If you're doing something that constitutes a



misuse, that's sole proximate cause. My client could not have done that, because he was doing, definitionally, what he was supposed to do and what Mr. Catalano said he was supposed to do at the time.

I see my time is up. I'm going to sit down.

Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel?

MR. FISHMAN: Yes, just briefly. First, Mr.

Catalano is not one of the eyewitnesses that we need to

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MR. FISHMAN: Yes, just briefly. First, Mr. Catalano is not one of the eyewitnesses that we need to depose. He was admittedly on the roof or some other level at the time of the accident and also heard about it afterwards and came down after the accident occurred.

The people we need to depose were the people that were at the scene, that were at the scaffold, whose names we only know as "Mike," "Mike," and the individual that was flagging the plaintiff.

JUDGE STEIN: How - - how did you plan to find out who they were?

MR. FISHMAN: We need to take a -- a subpoena on Town Masonry and get their payroll records to find out, you know, who was at the scene. The records that we have from Plaza don't identify the particular individuals that were actually working at the scene.

JUDGE STEIN: Was there a reason you hadn't done that yet?



MR. FISHMAN: We had chosen to take the 1 2 depositions first of Mr. Caratini and Mr. Catalano, who 3 were the people that were identified. We had - - -JUDGE STEIN: You didn't know the motion for 4 5 summary judgment was going to be - - -6 MR. FISHMAN: No, we had - - - because we had at 7 least until December 6th of that year, and we're talking 8 about June or July of that year, in order - - - before the 9 note of issue was even required to be filed, and in New 10 York County those note of issues can be extended if we - -- if necessary, if there's good reason to do so. So - - -11 12 JUDGE RIVERA: So - - - so, Counselor, I 13 understand that you're arguing that you don't know whether 14 or not he's negligent - - - used the machinery in a 15 negligent manner. Did you take the position that he was 16 not, in fact, elevated on this machine and using it? Was 17 that the argument you made? 18 MR. FISHMAN: Well, that's what Justice Tom 19 determined in the dissent. 20 JUDGE RIVERA: No, no, I'm asking you what you -2.1 - - your argument, what you preserved? 2.2 MR. FISHMAN: I don't recall that - - - that 23 issue being raised, whether or not the - - - the fact that 24 the platform was only inches off the ground. I think it 25 was raised, but I don't have a firm recollection of it.

But I just want to note that, in terms of the distinction between negligence and sole proximate cause, here we have the plaintiff admitting in its brief on page 28 that the "Plaintiff operated the prime mover in a way that created the instability which propelled plaintiff over the handlebars."

To me that sounds that, you know, the - - - the prime mover itself wouldn't have been unstable, except for the fact that the way plaintiff operated it. That's what the plaintiff is arguing before this court. That certainly raises a question of fact, whether or not, whatever he was doing, you know, goes to whether or not his negligence was the sole proximate cause or not.

And because this whole issue is premature, because of the need for discovery, at least the eyewitnesses who actually saw what happened, you know, we believe that the - - - this - - - the First Department's decision should be reversed, and the case should be remanded back to the Supreme Court in New York County so that we can conduct the discovery that we needed and what we should have been able to conduct before this motion was made.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, Counsel. (Court is adjourned)

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1		CERTIFICATION		
2				
3	I, K	aren Schiffmiller, certify that the foregoing		
4	transcript of	proceedings in the Court of Appeals of		
5	Michael Somere	ve, et al. v. Plaza Construction Corp., No.		
6	33 was prepared using the required transcription equipment			
7	and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.			
8		Wasen II M. M		
9	Karen Schiffmille			
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16		Suite 604		
17		New York, NY 10001		
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19	Date:	February 21, 2018		
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